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1 
Abstract 
Questioning the widespread tendency to view academic spin-outs as a homogenous category, 
the paper explores typologies of these companies using a Penrosean conceptualisation of 
entrepreneurial activity. We initially identify five main types of business activities pursued 
by academic entrepreneurs, which we revise after analysing a database of Cambridge 
University spin-outs and real-time exemplars of emerging ventures. The refined typology 
takes into account the dynamic of the entrepreneurial process. As the business models of 
ventures evolve they may enter a different category of business activity. We conclude by 
discussing the academic and practical needs for a better understanding of the heterogeneity 
of spin-outs, the diversity of which has theoretical and policy implications. 
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1 Introduction 
Spin-outs from universities are usually thought of as new firms commercialising a 
proprietary leading-edge technology from a university department, and backed by venture 
capital.1 They are viewed as the entrepreneurial alternative to licensing by many scientists 
and technology transfer officers (Lambert 2003). Studies of technology transfer providing 
descriptive statistics on academic entrepreneurship tend to depict spin-outs as a homogenous 
category (Charles and Conway 2001; HEFCE 2003; OECD 2002). There is a linear 
conception of the process of spin-off creation according to which a technology-based idea is 
generated from research, protected by patents, and transferred to a firm newly established to 
commercialise the idea.2  In his 1991 paper entitled “Why do firms differ and how does it 
matter?” Richard Nelson criticised the neoclassical view of the representative firm in 
economics (Nelson 1991).  We would like to question the idea of a standard academic spin-
out going through a linear process of emergence.3 An undifferentiated approach may restrict 
the understanding of science-based entrepreneurship and impede appropriate support by 
policy makers. 
This paper suggests an initial typology of university-based spin-outs grounded in a dynamic 
view of the entrepreneurial process. We argue that the resource-based view, and more 
particularly Penrose’s work (1995)4, provides a basis for conceptualising the emergence of 
entrepreneurial firms and for differentiating between science-based enterprises. Empirical 
evidence from Cambridge University in the UK is used and the paper draws on a database of 
university spin-outs and on real-time data on the creation of 9 companies. 
Cambridge University is an interesting case for the scope and history of entrepreneurial 
activities from the science-base, allowing us to explore the diversity of academic spin-outs in 
a single organisational setting. There were early spin-outs from the University of Cambridge, 
such as the Cambridge Scientific Instruments company founded in 1881 by Horace Darwin, 
Charles Darwin’s son. In the last 20-30 years the emergence of companies rooted in the 
                                                 
1 Venture capital has not been a significant source of finance for academic spin-outs because it does not provide 
seed capital of the kind early stage venture need. Some development companies are unusual in that they have 
been able to obtain venture capital on the prospects offered by outstanding new technologies with large 
eventual market potential, e.g. in biotechnology. 
2  See Autio (1997) for a critique of this conception. 
3 In the field of entrepreneurship, a tendency to overlook the diversity of entrepreneurs and the activity of their 
enterprises has also been noted (Ucbasaran, et al. 2001). 
4 Penrose wrote about growth in the mature firm, but her insight can be applied to new firms (Garnsey 1998). 
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University has become a feature of high-tech activities in Cambridge. Academic spin-outs 
have made a significant contribution to the Cambridge Phenomenon and today about 20% of 
the firms have a University founder (Segal Quince Wicksteed 2000).  
In the next section a brief review of the literature provides the rationale for the paper. We 
develop a Penrosean framework of the entrepreneurial process and propose a typology of 
spin-outs. In the third section we apply our concepts to a database of university spin-outs, 
and use case studies to exemplify types of business activities in the fourth section. Finally, 
we discuss the need for recognition of the multi-dimensional issues surrounding university 
spin-outs.  
2 Conceptual framework 
2.1  Literature review 
The growth of the literature on academic spin-outs, found mostly in the management and 
public policy disciplines, reflects the increased interest in this form of academia-to-industry 
technology transfer.  Empirically-based studies have identified a range of factors facilitating 
or hindering the creation and development of spin-outs (Blair and Hitchens 1998; Chiesa and 
Piccaluga 1998; Rappert and Webster 1998; Smilor et al. 1990; Stankiewicz 1994; 
Weatherston 1993).  Personal motivations, the business competencies of scientist-
entrepreneurs, the availability of external resources, and the university environment are 
found to play a significant role in encouraging or preventing entrepreneurial activity in 
universities. As universities structure their technology transfer activities, increasing attention 
is placed on universities policies and strategies that enhance or inhibit technology transfer 
(Clarysse et al. 2002; Lockett et al. 2003). 
Studies that consider the diversity of spin-outs remain rare. This may be because much of the 
spin-out research does not focus on the firm level but rather on their environment and the  
infrastructure support and public policies that encourage the emergence and growth of 
companies from the science base (Pirnay 2001; Roberts and Malone 1996). This reflects a 
research field still in its infancy.  
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Among those who recognised the diversity of spin-outs, Bullock (1983) early on identified 
‘soft’ companies, those that start as technical consultancies solving specific problems and 
require low initial funding and management skills. As companies develop, he assumed that 
they grow into ‘hard companies’ that sell standardised and relatively simplified products to a 
general market.5 Mustar (1997) distinguishes between firms according to the links they 
maintain with the science-base, while Autio (1997) proposes a more dynamic approach 
linking the niche markets of new technology-based firms and the transformation of 
knowledge they undertake. This leads him to identify science-based firms, which are 
“relatively more active in transforming scientific knowledge into basic technologies” and 
engineering-based firms which are ‘relatively more active in transforming basic technologies 
into application-specific technologies’ (p. 267). Stankiewizc (1994) classifies academic spin-
off companies according to the way they operate and identifies different modes of operations: 
consultancy and R&D contracting mode, product-orientated mode, and technological-asset 
orientated mode. Although he points out that these modes are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive and that firms can move from one to the other, he holds to his typology because 
each mode “requires a different set of technical skills, a different approach to management 
and financing, different linkages to the academic knowledge base, and a different form of 
infrastructural support” (p. 103).  
While these typologies are useful, the dynamic processes leading to firm emergence and 
growth may be overlooked when classifications represent static categories.   Different types 
of business activities pursued, the differing initial conditions and the distinct opportunities 
recognised can be expected to have an influence on the entrepreneurial process and on the 
prospects perceived for the spin-out, but these factors are not static. We propose to develop a 
typology linked to the entrepreneurial process of firm formation by drawing on the resource-
based view of the firm (Barney 1991; Grant 1991; Montgomery 1995; Penrose 1995). The 
relevance of resource-based approaches to new firm formation has been recognised by Brush 
et al. (2001) and Autio (1997).  But we draw attention to the feedback element central to 
Penrose’s original model, which allows for the way entrepreneurs adapt and modify their 
business ideas as they gain experience (Penrose 1995).  
                                                 
5 However this transition has been found only in a minority of actual cases. 
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2.2 The entrepreneurial process 
We view the entrepreneurial process as comprising the pursuit of opportunity, the 
mobilisation of resources and the creation of a resource base for business activity to deliver 
value and capture returms. The entrepreneur has to develop a conjecture or business idea of 
the means to create value and capture returns and, through the entrepreneurial process, 
translate this into a business model that can be implemented. 
Opportunity recognition. For Penrose, entrepreneurs seek to realise a productive 
opportunity, which refers to “the productive possibilities that the firms’ ‘entrepreneurs’ see 
and can take advantage of” (Penrose 1995, p. 31).  The concept emphasises the cognitive and 
cultural dimensions of enterprise.   
The first difficulty facing academic entrepreneurs is to identify and select a viable productive 
opportunity.  Opportunities are activated by recognition; they are objectively identifiable but 
their recognition is subjective and often depends on access to special knowledge. Research 
carried out in the university may result in potential for technologies that are highly generic 
and require further work to develop applications, with consequent uncertainty. The original 
patents frequently constitute an insufficient basis for exploitation.  Further developments, 
improvements and intellectual property protection are required if these technologies are to be 
exploited commercially.  The ‘pre-competitive’ status of this knowledge makes the task of 
identifying a market opportunity difficult (Garnsey and Moore 1993).  For scientists engaged 
in this type of research, the most suitable opportunity may be to provide ‘knowledge 
services’ on a consultancy basis, to make use of the scarce knowledge they have that is 
valuable to customers.  Prior knowledge can be expected to aid opportunity detection (Shane 
2000), as will connections and social capital (Aldrich 1999). Individual motivations provide 
incentives to pursue the opportunity. These incentives may be prospects of gain but there is 
evidence that other motives (e.g. commitment to a project, prestige, diffusion of inventions to 
society) are important in the creation of spin-outs (Weatherston 1993). 
Mobilisation of new combinations of resources. As compared with other business 
entrepreneurs, scientists can combine new resources through scarce expertise that may give 
rise to new productive activity based on leading edge technology.  But most scientists lack 
business expertise and the investment capital required to cover the expenses incurred in the 
lengthy development work needed to bring a technology closer to market.  Academic 
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research grants do not cover these costs. However academics can often make use of 
university facilities to reduce the expenditure required on infrastructure while an innovative 
productive base is being created (Druilhe and Garnsey 2001).  Scientist-entrepreneurs tend to 
minimise early resource outlays to keep open the pursuit of shifting opportunities. They find 
ways to exert leverage from the resources at their disposal. Resources available in the 
university and market environments are critical in this respect. The availability of 
investments funds affects the way new enterprises reach the market with their innovations.  
Organisation of the resource base. To realise the opportunity it is necessary to organise 
business activity, the conversion of inputs into revenue-generating outputs.  This is supported 
by the firm’s resource base that makes it possible to process resource inputs, produce a given 
type of output and secure returns from customers. Some resources, financial, physical and 
human, are mobilised from outside, others are created within the firm, where they are 
combined to make productive activity possible.   Building on Penrose, we also find it useful 
to distinguish between the productive and commercial dimensions of the resource base of a 
company. The productive base encompasses all the physical facilities of a company whereas 
the commercial base provides legal and marketing competence and supports partnerships and 
collaborations.  
A productive base may be very simple as in the case of a research services company or very 
complex in the case of a plant or other installation. Productive resources are made up of 
those resources that are currently in use for productive activity.  Penrose was dealing with 
mature firms that already had a base of this kind. The new firm, in contrast, rarely starts out 
with a productive base, except in special cases such as de-merger, but has to build one from 
the resources the entrepreneurs mobilise.  Penrose was concerned with the production base of 
manufacturing firms (‘industrial firms’). The term ‘productive base’ is used here because 
Penrose’s concept can also be applied to service activities. For example research services 
require the productive capacity to generate, process, store and retrieve information and 
convert it into meaningful knowledge communicated to clients.  As it grows, the firm’s 
resources may come to support a variety of productive bases, but Penrose pointed out that: ‘ 
… movement into a new base requires a firm to achieve competence in some significantly 
different area of technology’ (1995, p. 110). 
Both environmental and internal factors are sources of valuable resources in the emergence 
of spin-outs.  They shape one another in a dynamic relationship. Both are used to connect a 
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new idea or invention to a need or problem in the marketplace, thereby opening new 
opportunities. Penrose describes the environment as ‘an image in the entrepreneur’s mind’ 
(p. 42) to point to the importance of perceptions and subjectivity in the way in which the 
entrepreneur makes sense of the environment.6  
2.3 Types of business activity 
Penrose’s concepts of productive base and productive opportunity, which bridge firm and 
market, provide theoretical grounding for the notion of ‘business model’. This can be used to 
refer to the activity of a company, how this is resourced, the way it creates value and how 
returns are to be realised. We propose here a typology of business activities, that, in the case 
of successful firms, is underpinned by a business model generating sustainable returns. 
The most accessible market opportunity appears to be the provision of research-based 
consultancy or research services to customers. In contrast the creation of a physical 
production base requires investment capital and is likely to be remote from the scientists’ 
experience.  The next most accessible opportunity would appear to involve developing 
technological resources and protecting them with intellectual property rights that can be 
licensed or sold to customers.  In this case the productive activity is to develop a technology 
from ‘pre-competitive’ on to ‘near-market’ status and find ways to appropriate returns from 
their research findings through licensing or sale. The term ‘development company’ can be 
used to refer to a company of this kind that pulls together initial intellectual property rights 
(IPR), on which future IPR are built through research and development. As intellectual 
resources, these are not embodied in a physical production base making products. Licensing 
and a variety of research contracts with pharmaceutical corporations is the route chosen by 
drug discovery ventures which do not aim at integrated drug production because of the 
production costs.  Software start-ups have certain features in common with IP-based start-ups 
since their product involves licensing software, but there is also a production process for 
software production, albeit one with lower scaling up costs than for the production of 
physical products.  The most demanding route would appear to be the creation of a physical 
infrastructure for the output of a product based on research activities. This is the case of 
those environmental companies that require the establishment of a new infrastructure to 
                                                 
6 It is generally assumed that Penrose was concerned exclusively with internal factors, but those who go back to 
her own work see that she emphasises the interplay between the firm’s resources and its environment. This has 
been missed in much of the discussion of Penrose but is one reason why her work is relevant to the new firm. 
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support their green technologies. An infrastructure may also be required to support the 
products of telecommunication companies. 
We propose that university spin-outs fall into these five categories along a spectrum shown 
in Figure 1. The entrepreneur’s prior experience and knowledge will influence progress in 
interaction with the intensity of resources required. We initially assumed that the closer to 
the scientist’s knowledge and experience of the business activity, and the fewer resources 
required, the faster will be progress to market.7 
Entrepreneurs’ relevant
knowledge/experience
Extensive
Resource requirements
Limited
Product
License IP
Create infrastructure
Technical consultancy, sales 
(distribution), research services
Limited Extensive
Software
 
Figure 1: Five broad categories of university spin-outs 
 
We argue that the type of business opportunity selected influences the entrepreneurial 
process and activities outlined above. These do not unfold in a sequential manner but rather 
involve feedback loops and setbacks. Entrepreneurial projects progress through the continual 
interaction between shifting opportunities and emerging combinations of resources. In order 
to overcome constraints on knowledge and other resources, enterprise requires collective 
endeavour. Entrepreneurs must build partnerships integral to their business models. In what 
follows we apply these concepts to the analysis of Cambridge spin-outs, drawing first on a 
database and then on case studies.  
                                                 
7 We have reported elsewhere that our empirical investigation revealed how motivated and knowledgeable 
entrepreneurs in some cases can overcome what appear to be inhibiting factors (Druilhe and Garnsey 2003). 
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3 Spin-out activity at Cambridge University 
The evidence from Cambridge is presented here to illustrate the range of entrepreneurial 
activities originating from the science base and the influence of the environment on spin-out 
activity. Cambridge high-tech activity was not confined to spin-outs from the University but 
these have had significant influence. In 1985 it was found that 25% of the high-tech firms in 
the Cambridge area had a founder originating from Cambridge University or a research 
establishment coming from the Cambridge area. As the high-tech complex grew, an 
increasingly higher number of ventures spun out of existing companies.  Others were 
attracted to the region. By 1999, of the companies founded since 1990, only 17% had a 
founder coming directly from Cambridge University or a Cambridge research centre (Segal 
Quince Wicksteed 2000). 
3.1 Methodology: spin-outs database 
We use a database developed by the University of Cambridge Entrepreneurship Centre since 
2001 to gather information at University of Cambridge spin-outs. Although not exhaustive, 
this is the most complete database available about Cambridge University to date.  However it 
uses a broad definition of university spin-outs, including all academic fields and counting as 
spin-outs companies that were started by Cambridge graduates long after they had left the 
University. For the purpose of this research, we restricted our analysis to direct spin-outs, i.e. 
companies drawing on university-based technological and scientific knowledge and 
involving academics or students who were still members or had just quit the University. 
From 184 companies we only retained 109 companies started since 1979, excluding those 
started in management fields or by Cambridge graduates having long completed their degree. 
The database included new firms at their date of creation; some of these companies have 
since ceased their operations or have been acquired. 
3.2 Growth in spin-out activity 
Over the last twenty years, the number of spin-outs emerging from Cambridge University has 
steadily increased, largely reflecting an improvement of the environment for 
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entrepreneurship (see Table 1).8 In the past ten years, about 9 companies a year spun out 
from Cambridge University. The number of companies has increased in three periods. Until 
1991, figures were below five a year. This corresponds to the period where high-technology 
activities were emerging and growing in Cambridge. From 1992 to the late 1990s, figures 
increased to 5-10 a year. From 1998, the number of spin-outs has tended to exceed 10 per 
year. 
These data, relatively high compared to most other UK universities reveal the existence of a 
favourable environment for entrepreneurship, recognised as early as 1985 (Segal Quince & 
Partners 1985). The approach of Cambridge University to technology commercialisation was 
distinct from that of many UK universities: Cambridge did not directly provide support for 
entrepreneurship, but in the context of world-class scientific research, the University’s 
laissez-faire approach to technology transfer and lack of formal policy and infrastructure did 
not prevent academic inventors from taking their technologies to market.  
The University allowed academic staff to undertake outside work as long as their 
commitment was to the advancement of university’s teaching, scholarship and research. It 
was up to individual academics whether and in what manner they engaged in outside work. 
This allowed individual academics to undertake ad hoc activities such as private consultancy 
and business creation. This liberal standpoint differed from the situation in other universities 
in the UK, the US or many European countries where clear rules usually regulate the 
involvement of scientists in outside work so as to prevent the emergence of potential 
conflicts of interest and to ensure that academics devote enough time to their core activities 
(Bower 1992; Matkin 1990). 
The IP policy was similarly liberal, and unless their research was funded by research 
councils or the ownership of IPR imposed by an industrial contract, academics could claim 
the IPR of their inventions. This is reflected in the statistics outlined in Table 1: in only 42 
cases, i.e. about one-third of the companies, did the University formally participate in firm 
                                                 
8 Cambridge is well positioned compared to other UK universities: there were 248 spin-outs formed in 
2000/2001 in the UK, 203 in 1999/2000 but the concentration of spin-offs among a few universities is 
significant: in 1999/2000, only 24 HEI had more than 2 spin-offs and these accounted for 136 of the 183 
reported (Charles and Conway 2001, HEFCE 2003). 
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formation. This mainly involved the University owning the IPR on the invention and taking 
an equity stake in the company.9  
The informal and diffuse approach to technology transfer in place in Cambridge was long 
considered to have a positive influence on the growth of the ‘Cambridge Phenomenon’ and 
innovation from the science base (Druilhe and Garnsey 2001; Garnsey and Lawton Smith 
1998; Segal Quince & Partners 1985). The conscious avoidance of a structured and detailed 
policy governing links with industry created a favourable environment, flexible and non-
bureaucratic, in which industrial links of all kinds have been allowed to prosper and the 
spontaneous creativity of researchers has been enhanced. 10  
Since the late 1990s, the University has entered a period of transition and the IP position is 
being reconsidered. Initially  providing academics with little support but significant 
independence in their interactions with industry to a proactive and more structured approach 
to research commercialisation and technology transfer. The growth observed after 1998 in 
venture creation figures may reflect not only the high-tech enthusiasm of the end of the 
century but also the fact that Cambridge University started new initiatives to encourage and 
assist academic entrepreneurs.  Several organisations, often supported by government 
initiatives, were established and include Cambridge University Entrepreneurs, a student-run 
association organising business plan competition, and from 2000, the University of 
Cambridge Entrepreneurship Centre (CEC), the University Challenge Fund (UCF), and the 
reorganised and better resourced technology transfer office (TTO). The impact of the 
creation of such infrastructure on firm birth rates will only be clearly observed over a longer 
time period.  
                                                 
9 The liberal position of the University of Cambridge is currently undergoing significant change and pressures 
to align with other UK universities. After a first move in 2001 towards University ownership of all externally-
funded research, University officials put forward a proposal according to which all IPR originating from 
Cambridge University would be owned by the University.  Facing strong opposition from University academics 
in the fall of 2002, the project was withdrawn. A new report was written in spring 2003 and was expected to go 
through another process of examination and assessment. 
10  The rationale for the traditionally liberal policy was as follows: “The University has for many years adopted 
a non-bureaucratic stance towards the exploitation by staff of inventions, software, and other revenue-
producing ideas. This policy has been considered to be the major factor in the development of the ‘Cambridge 
Phenomenon’ (Segal, Quince, Wicksteed 1985), and has also been of considerable advantage to the University. 
Encouragement to academic staff to pursue their own ideas and to develop the results of their research has been 
a key factor in the success of the Cambridge Science Park run by Trinity College, and more recently the 
Innovation Centre run by St John’s College. It is not intended to change this policy in any major way, since the 
incentive that it provides for members of staff has been found to produce substantial returns to the University.” 
Cambridge University Reporter, 11 July 1996, p. 934. 
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Table 1: Growth in spin-out activity from Cambridge University 
Year
All spin-outs 
that year
Consulting /  
Services 
com pany
Developm ent 
com pany
Product-based 
com pany
Software 
com pany
1979 1 1
1984 1 1
1985 3 1 2
1987 2 1 1
1989 5 2 2 1
1990 2 1 1
1991 2 2
1992 4 1 2
1993 6 1 2
1994 5 3 1
1995 6 3 3
1996 7 1 3 3
1997 7 2 3 1 1
1998 11 3 5 1 2
1999 16 3 5 2 6
2000 8 1 3 3 1
2001 15 3 8 2 2
2002 8 2 2 1 3
TO TAL 1979-
2002
109 20 37 23 29
Percentage 100% 18% 34% 21% 27%
1
3
1
 
3.3 Diversity of entrepreneurial activity: distribution by category 
We classified the companies according to our typology. It may seem surprising that only 
18% of the companies were involved in consulting or research services, the most accessible 
opportunity in relation to the scientist’s knowledge and experience and resources needed. 
However, the number of spin-outs does not reflect the extent of academics’ involvement in 
consultancy.  Because of their small scale and the autonomy granted to Cambridge 
academics, these activities are difficult to track.  In particular, research services and 
consultancy do not require the formation of a company since they can readily be provided on 
a private or freelance basis.11   
Most of the consulting companies are technical, building directly upon the research activities 
of the founding scientists (e.g. Topexpress, Cambridge Discovery Chemistry12). Others are 
                                                 
11 As an indicator, the number of consultancy contracts signed through the Technology Transfer Office by a 
University member of staff and a company was 44 in 2001-2002 and although this probably represents only a 
small proportion of all contracts signed, it is much higher than the figure of two consulting companies started in 
2001 found in Table 1.  
12 Topexpress was initially started in 1979 by Professor J. E. Ffowcs-Williams from Cambridge University’s 
Engineering Department who drew on his research to support the Ministry of Defence with acoustics problems 
which to that date had proved intractable, and to branch out into other areas such as active noise control, drag 
reduction, internal waves in the ocean, and various fluid-dynamics problems. Cambridge Discovery Chemistry 
provides innovative chemistry services to accelerate discovery and process research serving the pharmaceutical, 
agrochemical and biotechnology industries.  
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more oriented towards the provision of business services or are involved in sales (e.g. 
Abcam, Invest Solutions, Handheldsfordoctors, Envisional).13  
Development companies set up to commercialise an immature technology. These make 
34% of the companies in the sample. Their proportion has significantly increased over the 
period to represent 40% of the sample in the 1998-2002 period (see Table 2). This illustrates 
a tendency observed in Cambridge whereby high-tech companies commercialise their 
patented technologies through a licensing model. This model is most commonly found in 
biotechnology (30 companies out of 37), but also in other sectors, particularly advanced 
materials which also have a long gestation period. Some earlier spin-outs adopted this model 
including Cambridge Display Technology, which was founded in 1992 and conducts R&D in 
light-emitting polymers for use in a wide variety of electronic display products. Recent spin-
outs in the Engineering or ICT sectors have also opted for the development company route, 
including Polight Technologies14 and Plastic Logic.15 
Product companies. These form a significant part of the sample. However, many do not 
correspond strictly to our category, which defined the establishment of production facilities 
as an important characteristic.  They tend to target a niche market and remain small. They 
engage in prototype production or high-quality low-volume production. Their need for 
resources may not be as significant as that of development companies. Niche high-tech 
production companies16 tend to be concentrated in the engineering and ICT sectors. Some of 
                                                 
13 Abcam drew directly upon Dr Milner’s research experience: “Like many life science researchers, I was 
frustrated by the time it took to locate and select antibodies essential for my research. This was largely due to 
poor information and out-of-date catalogues from the vast range of suppliers who were spread across many 
countries. In some cases, I also experienced difficulties with companies whose products were unreliable and 
whose customer service was slow and unhelpful. My vision was to build a company that offered reliable 
products, great customer service and that would enable researchers to quickly find the best antibodies for their 
research” (source: www.abcam.com) Invest Solutions provides flexible solutions to website needs; 
Handheldsfordoctors provides consultancy services on the use of handheld technology in healthcare; Envisional 
offers intellectual property protection and monitoring solutions. 
14 Polight Technologies develops novel glassy-like materials with unusual opto-mechnical properties when 
exposed to laser light. 
15 Plastic Logic develops of plastic electronics technology. Founded in November 2000, as a spinout from 
Cambridge University’s Cavendish Laboratory, Plastic Logic builds on over 10 years of fundamental academic 
research. It develops and exploits a portfolio of intellectual property based on inkjet printing of active 
electronic circuits using advanced plastic materials. 
16 e.g. Biorobotics, Adder Technology, CEDAR Audio, SmartBead Technologies, Cambridge Positioning 
Systems. 
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these companies are patent-based17 but not all: for instance, a number of instrumentation 
companies do not rely on patents.18 
Software companies 19 Overall, these represent about a quarter of all spin-outs in the sample, 
reflecting the strength of the Computer Laboratory and the Engineering Department in 
Cambridge.  
Table 2: Distribution of business activities by category over the three periods as a percentage of all 
Cambridge University spinouts over that period 
1984-1991 1992-1997 1998-2002 1984-2002
No of years 8 5 5 18
Consulting firm s 3 4 12 19
Percentage 20% 11% 21% 18%
Developm ent 
com panies 4 10 23
37
Percentage 27% 29% 40% 34%
Product-based 5 9 9 23
Percentage 33% 26% 16% 21%
Software 3 12 14 29
Percentage 19% 34% 24% 27%
All spin-outs over 
the period
15 35 58 108
Percentage 100% 100% 100% 100%  
4 Case exemplars by category 
The classification of university spin-outs on the basis of our categories revealed a greater 
diversity than encompassed in our initial typology. We turn to case studies from this database 
used as exemplars of the entrepreneurial process in order to refine our analysis and proposed 
typology. The data collection process was grounded in the Penrosean notions of productive 
opportunity and productive base, which provide theoretical grounding for the current concept 
of the business model (‘how the company makes money’).  
                                                 
17 e.g. Teraview, Cambridge Gemonics. 
18 e.g. Cambridge Magnetic Refrigeration. 
19 e.g. Apama,  Wax Info, Cambridge Cell Networks. 
15 
4.1 Real-time data20 
Most studies of academic spin-outs concern academic ventures that have actually become 
operational enterprises (Blair and Hitchens 1998; Brett et al. 1991; Chiesa and Piccaluga 
1998; Downes and Eadie 1998; Rappert and Webster 1998; Roberts and Malone 1996; 
Smilor et al. 1990).  The survival bias in these studies reflects the difficulty of obtaining 
evidence on scientists’ intentions to commercialise research findings if these do not actually 
eventuate as incorporated ventures.  This often results in a retrospective bias.  Through 
participant-observation, we collected real-time data on the emergence of spin-off projects, 
without prior knowledge of whether they would become operational. Participant-observation 
data was collected through the Anglia Enterprise Network (AEN), a mentoring service for 
scientists and technologists and a means to introduce them to private investors.21   Between 
1997 and 1999,22 over sixty academics and local entrepreneurs were contacted by the 
advisors of the Anglia Enterprise Network. Participation in AEN furnished real-time 
evidence collected through participant-observation in 1998-1999 of over 40 scientists and 
academic engineers. Among these, nine cases progressed significantly over the consulting 
period and provided the core of the case studies.23 
In selecting cases, we were able to obtain exemplars of a variety of business activity types 
pursued by science-based enterprise: those applying knowledge through consulting and other 
services, through licensing intellectual property, and through production.  
                                                 
20 In what follows we draw on material presented in a forthcoming paper in the Journal of Technology Transfer 
but with a different objective, viz. to clarify differences between types of spin-outs in the light of new evidence 
from our database analysis (Druilhe and Garnsey 2003). 
21 The Anglia Enterprise Network was conceived and implemented by a group of people working in enterprise 
support before active programs of this kind were available to scientists in the Cambridge area. While scientists 
who wanted to take out a patent or start a company could go to the University’s Industrial Liaison Unit, in the 
1990s this was understaffed and unable to be proactive in approaching scientists.  An initiative was undertaken 
to introduce entrepreneurs to private investors and run a proactive mentoring service for the region. A grant 
was obtained from the Department of Trade and Industry under a program for SMEs administered by the local 
Business Link. This initiative was supported by the University of Cambridge Institute for Manufacturing. 
Negotiations with interested parties in the community were chaired by Walter Herriot, the Director of the St 
John’s Innovation Centre in Cambridge. The Anglia Enterprise Network was given a regional focus and 
managed by St John’s Innovation Centre with a part time administrator. The regional focus of the Anglia 
Enterprise Network made it possible to extend the service beyond the university.  A business advisor with 
relevant experience at the British Technology Group was engaged and a graduate taken on to ferret out projects 
in science and engineering laboratories. Regular meetings to introduce entrepreneurs and private investors were 
organised, drawing on the investor network that had been developed at the Innovation Centre off the Science 
Park.  Mentoring was provided to prepare entrepreneurs to present their projects to investors. One of the 
authors worked for the Anglia Enterprise Network and obtained first hand experience and detailed evidence on 
the spin out process while working on her PhD on technology transfer 
22 In 1999, the remit was transferred to the newly founded University Challenge Fund. 
23 For those 9 companies, participant-observation data collected during 6 to 8 meetings over a nine to twelve-
month period was complemented by follow-up interviews in 2001 with the scientist-entrepreneurs. 
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 4.2 Enterprise emergence by category 
 
Table 3: 9 case studies and their progress in the entrepreneurial process 
Technology Type of business activity envisaged or 
pursued 
1. Optical device Development company (licensing or 
manufacturing) 
2. Novel type of antenna  Development company (licensing) 
3. Rapid diagnostic kits for the 
developing world 
Development company (licensing or 
manufacturing) 
4. Anaesthetic technique for laser 
surgery 
Development company (licensing or 
manufacturing) 
5. Scientific instrument: magnetic 
refrigerator for low-temperature 
experiments 
Product company 
6. Instrument: motion capture system 
and analysis software 
Product company 
7. Instrumentation for seafloor projects Product company 
8. Robotic equipment for biotechnology 
sector 
Product company 
9. Voice recognition technology Software company 
 
 
Development companies. In cases 1 and 2 (Table 3) a promising invention originated from 
the science base. Although commercial potential was soon detected, recognition of a specific 
productive opportunity was particularly difficult because of the generic nature of the 
technology and lack of contact with possible users.  However, the potential for creating 
economic value was identified.  Resources were mobilised for research and development, 
covering patent costs and designing a commercialisation strategy.  
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In case 1, the scientist-entrepreneur went through a lengthy process of opportunity 
identification alongside technology development.  The optical device developed offered the 
advantage of being generic and innovative, thus opening many applications and being easy to 
protect. However to find a route to market it was necessary to identify specific applications 
that would create value for a new company, which proved difficult: potential users could not 
see an application for this early stage technology and scientists’ prior knowledge and 
experience of the sectors in which the technology could be applied were limited. Resources 
were accessed within the university to offset these disadvantages: students, departmental 
business managers assisted with market research. The advisor from the AEN mentoring 
scheme provided strategic advice. Connections were critical: the contacts within the 
Cambridge-based investment community developed by the entrepreneurial group leader 
allowed the scientists to obtain feedback on his project from venture capitalists. Raising 
funding before development work reached a market-focused stage proved impossible. Public 
research resources were insufficient to cover development costs and the project progressed 
slowly. These strains led to internal conflict. Eventually, the scientist, who had left his 
department, could not secure a license on the original patents of the technology.  The 
company was closed down.   
Case 2, the development of a novel type of antenna, is currently still at the research stage, 
with experimental work being carried out by partners in Oxford University.  Further progress 
along the route to market will depend upon the experimental results attained.  A research 
grant was first awarded by a Research Council to a research group in Oxford to test the 
theory developed by the Cambridge scientist. This was later complemented by an Oxford 
University Challenge Fund Investment. If experimental work is successful, specific 
applications, in particular in the scientific market, could be readily commercialised.  A 
company was formed, pulling together initial IPR, and to which future IPR would be added 
on the basis of experimental developments. This case illustrates both the high potential for 
value creation and the uncertain development trajectory of a radically new technology of 
which the basic principles still need to be proven.  
In both cases, given the early stage of the technologies, resource creation and opportunity 
recognition were interdependent: the recognition of a particular opportunity partly directed 
research and development, while the technology path taken and the exploration of various 
technological options also dictated what opportunities were achievable. Resources were 
mobilised in the proximate environment: the university for technical and financial support; 
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the local environment for exploring sources of funding (venture capitalists). Personal 
connections were a valuable resource (research group in Oxford in case 2). 
In cases 3 and 4 (see Table 3), costly resource requirements delayed the creation of value, 
and hence returns.  The scientists had direct industrial experience and industrial contacts, 
which triggered the recognition of a specific commercial opportunity.  But it was clear that 
the resources required to develop the technology to the point where it could provide a 
productive base would be considerable.  Raising commercial funds was necessary where 
research grants were unavailable for this purpose. This is a role now undertaken by the 
government’s Challenge Fund, in the light of reluctance of venture capitalists to fund such 
work..   
Both technologies required heavy patent protection and regulatory approval was needed for 
medical devices. The scientists subsequently undertook further R&D within the university to 
develop the technology as required in order to pursue this opportunity.  In case 4, grants from 
various charities and organisations provided a regular stream of research funding but 
mobilising resources for commercialisation required a clearer view of the appropriate route 
to market.  In case 3, which aimed to develop an anaesthetic technique for laser surgery, self-
funding ensured early development but did not suffice to carry the technology through 
clinical trials.  The team engaged in a lengthy process exploring various commercialisation 
options, including licensing, outsourcing development, and starting a VC-backed company. 
Resource mobilisation was all the more difficult when selection of the route to market was 
not straightforward.  Both teams eventually opted to set up a development company, 
incubated within the university by the research group and associates with relevant technical 
skills. A development company is created specifically to advance a technology that has 
commercial potential, and must attract investors or partners by offering them a stake in 
eventual returns. In case 3, seed funding from Catalyst Biomedica secured funding, while in 
case 4, a University Challenge Fund investment eventually provided finance needed for R&D 
and patenting costs. Prior industrial knowledge, useful connections and the market focus of 
the technology aided progress for this type of enterprise. The lengthy development period, 
the difficulty of creating a productive base and the extent of financial resources required 
explain why these projects did not result in value creation as quickly as the three cases 
analysed below.  
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Product companies. In three cases, the recognition of an opportunity built directly on the 
scientists’ prior knowledge and connections (cases 5, 6 and 7).  The technologies had been 
developed as research tools and commercial and the scientific activities were 
complementary.  Development of the technology for own use and the connections formed 
during research with suppliers and users of the technology resulted in the early identification 
of a market opportunity. Products could be sold into technical markets alongside a service 
relying on the expert knowledge of the scientists. The scientists could leverage their links to 
the academic, governmental, and corporate scientific communities to access customers.  
Resources required to reach a niche market were accessible.  In case 5 and 7, the scientists 
started a product-oriented company, following an organic development path, relying mostly 
on self-financing after initial seed funding was provided by friends and family support, a 
SMART award, or research grants.  Since the scientists’ expertise could generate returns 
with relatively low resource requirements, these product-oriented ventures delivered value 
relatively early and could potentially secure returns soon.  
Case 6 stands in contrast with the early progress of case 5 and 7.  Although a productive 
opportunity was identified and involved developing a motion capture system and software 
for the sport and medical markets, the potential for value-creation and returns was soon 
found to be too low in relation to costs, once further development of the technology had been 
undertaken.  The mobilisation of resources was problematic because the technology was in 
the public domain and intellectual property rights were unavailable.  Private investors were 
only prepared to invest a small amount, judged insufficient by the scientist-entrepreneurs to 
carry out development and commercialisation on a scalable basis.  Although the scientists 
decided not to proceed with commercialisation, further research was carried out on the 
technology for which applications were found in various settings.  Thus some economic 
value was created in technology developed for experimental medical and sports applications, 
but no financial return was generated for the originators. 
In case 8, robotic equipment for the biotechnology research market was developed within a 
university department.  A productive opportunity was recognised by the entrepreneurs 
through their contacts with geneticists.  This enabled them to identify a market for low cost, 
compact automation equipment for biotech labs.  Though there were many difficulties in 
developing the product to a high standard of quality and reliability (as shown by the failure 
of a rival project  at the MRC using the same initial IP to achieve this), the precision 
engineering and software technology of the newly created productive base was state of the 
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art rather than immature.  Early development costs were covered by another university 
department as customer. The funds available in this customer department resulted from 
earlier academic enterprise by the customer scientist, who had acted as distributor of 
equipment for genetic research.  His simple retailing ‘productive base’ had generated 
revenues which subsidised the development of the more extensive productive base required 
for scientific instrument production.  The entrepreneurs who founded the lab equipment 
company avoided external funding because they wanted to retain control over their company.  
These entrepreneurs were new to the product and market, but were experienced engineers 
with business knowledge.  Their new product stream and impressive trading performance 
attracted a US company that acquired the venture in 2000, realising very high returns to the 
entrepreneurs.  
Product companies progressed faster than the development companies because fewer 
resources were required and the opportunity had a clear focus early on. Business and 
commercial activities were complementary. 
Software. Voice recognition software had been developed by the entrepreneur in case 9 and 
was being further refined in order to apply a generic technology to more specific market 
needs.  Shortly after the venture was founded, an attractive acquisition offer was received.  
The academic left his post and his venture was incorporated into a successful global Internet 
company, itself a university spin-out. The focused opportunity and advanced development of 
the technological resource made the software venture an attractive target.  Corporate 
acquisition allowed the entrepreneur to access finance to take his technology to market and 
develop new products.  
5 Concluding discussion 
This analysis of spin-outs in Cambridge using database and case study evidence has shown 
the extent of their diversity. Although our initial typology was valid (consultancy, 
development company, software, product-based company, infrastructure creation), it 
conflated important sub-sectors as revealed in the empirical analysis and outlined in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Refined categories of academic spin-outs activities 
 
The case studies show that the business models of new ventures are altered as entrepreneurs 
improve their knowledge of resources and opportunities. In the case of development 
companies, these may initially be set up to commercialise a technology for licensing but may 
later aim at downstream services and production. A reverse mutation may occur as the 
objectives of the business model change from production to licensing. Although in the 
previous section we classed case studies between types of activity, there was some shift in 
categories as business models evolved. In case 3 for instance, although the scientists initially 
aimed at licensing their early-stage technology, they eventually set up a development 
company to move the technology closer to market while redefining their business model and 
examining various options including production. In case 6, from a purely product-oriented 
company, the emphasis shifted to the combined supply of a product and service. Further 
exploration of the market had shown that targeting niche markets for specific applications 
and providing a customised offer were the only viable way of capturing returns for the 
inventors. However, this model did not match the scientists’ expectations and interests and 
direct commercialisation was abandoned. 
It is also apparent that our two-dimensional axes over-simplify the dimensions that interact in 
the emergence of academic spin-off companies and influence the adoption of specific 
business models. Elsewhere (Druilhe and Garnsey 2001), we have shown that the 
characteristics of the productive opportunity are influenced by: 
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 • Market specificity 
• Market size 
• Competitive intensity 
• Maturity of the technology 
These factors interact with features of the venture’s productive and commercial resources 
which include: 
• Initial resource endowment 
• Resource intensity 
• Resource availability 
• Type of technology 
• Maturity of the (technological) resources of the venture  
This discussion brings to the fore the complexity of the issues that academic entrepreneurs 
face and need to resolve when they start an academic enterprise. These are among the factors 
that affect the viability of the business model selected. The difficulty for scientist-
entrepreneurs is that they may act pragmatically in opting for a specific business model on 
the basis of resource endowments but this business model may not be a good fit with the 
emerging market opportunity, leading either to failure of the company or lower returns. The 
productive opportunity of an academic venture can only be realised,  with a limited initial 
resource base, if the venture can set up appropriate partnerships and collaborations.  Since 
partnerships are essential to success, support schemes should be based on improved 
understanding of collaboration strategies and of the factors cited above.  
These findings have theoretical and practical implications, calling for further investigation. 
We need to recognise the heterogeneity of spin-outs to avoid simplistic measurements and 
assumptions about science-based enterprise. It is necessary to develop more rigorous metrics 
to assess  commercialisation activities and their success. Recognising the heterogeneity of 
spin-outs will improve our theoretical understanding of academic entrepreneurship. It will 
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also open scope for policy-makers to provide appropriate support, recognising that different 
types of spin-outs have very different needs and resource requirements. 
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